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BALANCING “AGGRESSION” AND COMPASSION
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION
AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
Alexander H. McCabe*
There is a problematic overlap between bona fide humanitarian
intervention and the crime of aggression. Under international law, the
crime of aggression is defined so vaguely that it potentially could be
applied to try leaders who seek to stop documented mass atrocities with
armed force. This Note seeks a resolution to that overlap: a path that
would allow those who would plan and engage in bona fide humanitarian
intervention to be exempt from prosecution for aggression. The Note first
examines the genealogy of the crime of aggression. It then analyzes several
possible solutions to policing aggression without unduly deterring
humanitarian intervention. Finally, this Note concludes that the existing
imbalance can be corrected by: (1) granting the International Criminal
Court exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the crime of
aggression, (2) modifying the current regulations to bar the U.N. Security
Council in prosecuting the crime of aggression, and (3) developing an
affirmative defense to the crime of aggression that would allow indicted
leaders to use either a high or low evidentiary standard depending on
whether their state acted alone or through a multilateral organization.
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INTRODUCTION
Something is rotten in the fictional state of Bellicosia. The small state
has been brutally occupying and destroying cities in its restive eastern part.
While the government claims to be crushing an open rebellion, the world
media and local opposition groups have, for months, spread stories of
indiscriminate use of armed force against civilians. There are rumors of
torture and the deliberate bombing of local hospitals and schools. Since the
majority of the population in this region consists of an ethnic minority,
accusations of genocide gain traction.
While some member states at the U.N. Security Council (UNSC)
strongly advocate a humanitarian military intervention to stop these
atrocities, a powerful Bellicosian ally threatens to veto any resolution
authorizing armed force. Back-channel negotiation and threats of serious
economic sanctions prove unsuccessful.
Finally, an international alliance acts. Heads of state, cabinet officials,
and military leaders from the world’s most powerful nations plan and carry
out an extended bombing campaign against government and military
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targets. They later invade from neighboring states, occupying eastern
Bellicosia and effectively ending any military activity in the region.
Back at the United Nations, Bellicosian allies and other states—
concerned with what they perceive as the powerful alliance’s gross
flaunting of restrictive international norms on the use of armed force—
demand that the International Criminal Court (ICC) act against the alliance
heads of state, cabinet, and military officials for planning and executing
crimes of aggression against Bellicosia.1 The ICC prosecutor launches an
investigation against these leaders. The vague definitions of the “crime of
aggression” and who can be prosecuted for it sparks a detailed and
confusing international legal debate. Any hope that states once had for the
ICC to be a respected part of international criminal law is buried under
ambiguities and questions of procedure.
This Note concerns the concept of “aggression” in international law and
the past and future practice of prosecuting individuals for the “crime of
aggression.” It asks, and attempts to answer, three critical questions:
(1) what is the crime of aggression and who gets to define it, (2) whom can
we prosecute for the crime and who decides who shall be prosecuted, and
(3) how can we ensure that state leaders and officials who use armed forces
in a foreign country for legitimate humanitarian reasons do not get
prosecuted for the crime?
To that end, Part I discusses the crime of aggression and humanitarian
intervention, touching on their past histories and current state. Part II
reviews the literature proposing both procedural and substantive solutions
to address the problematic overlap. Part III critically assesses these
solutions and concludes that (1) under international law the crime of
aggression is still unclear but that a working definition sufficient to generate
indictments can be pieced together from customary international law; (2)
the ICC should have complete and exclusive jurisdiction for defining and
prosecuting crimes of aggression as the international political branches—
namely the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) and Security Council—are
unable to provide a fair trial and have proven to be too political in their past
usage of aggression to be reliable; and (3) in the interest of protecting bona
fide humanitarian interveners, the court should establish a two-tier
affirmative defense. The two tiers establish a high standard of evidence
when the initiator of force is outside of the target state’s region and a lower
tier when regional multilateral organizations from within the target’s region
initiate.
I. WALKING THE TIGHTROPE: THE BALANCE AS IT STANDS
This part clarifies the crime of aggression and humanitarian intervention
as they currently stand in international law. It first provides a brief
background of international law sources. It then examines the crime of
aggression and “act of aggression” definitions as they have developed over
time and as they currently stand today, dividing the sources between
1. “Crimes of aggression” are defined infra Part I.B.
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treaties, customary international law, and general principles. Finally, it
examines emerging international legal standards for humanitarian
intervention.
A. Sources and Enforcement of International Law
International law has a variety of sources, which are memorialized in the
U.N.-created Statute of the International Court of Justice.2 Article 38 of the
statute lists three groups of sources: (1) international conventions and
treaties, (2) customary international law, and (3) the general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations.3
Treaties and international conventions are written, contract-like
documents by which states explicitly agree to be bound.4 They are the
dominant form of international law and are interpreted according to
principles outlined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.5
Article 31(1) of that convention provides that “a treaty shall be
interpreted . . . in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.”6 If interpreting this plain meaning creates an “ambiguous or
obscure” or “manifestly absurd or unreasonable” result, the treaty’s
preparatory work (i.e., legislative history) and the “circumstances of its
conclusion”—collectively known as the “travaux préparatoires”—may be
used as a supplementary interpretative aid.7
The U.N. Charter is the preeminent international legal treaty, superior to
all other legal obligations that any of its signatories may have.8 It created
the United Nations which continually acts to shape international law
through its various bodies, primarily the UNSC and the UNGA.9 Article 25
of the U.N. Charter binds member states to carry out Security Council
decisions.10 UNGA resolutions are recommendations and thus usually
nonbinding,11 but they do contribute to customary international law.12 The
U.N. Charter directly addresses and regulates the legality of uses of armed
force in international affairs.13

2. U.N. Charter art. 92–96; JAN KLABBERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (2013).
3. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031
[hereinafter ICJ Statute].
4. KLABBERS, supra note 2, at 25–26.
5. Id. at 26–27.
6. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter Vienna Counvention].
7. Id. at art. 32.
8. U.N. Charter art. 103.
9. Id. at art. 9–22 (creating and detailing the General Assembly’s structure and
procedures), id. at art. 23–32 (creating and detailing the Security Council’s structure and
procedures).
10. Id. at art. 25.
11. Id. at art. 10, 14; GERHARD KEMP, INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIME OF AGGRESSION 117 (2010).
12. KLABBERS, supra note 2, at 87.
13. U.N. Charter art. 33–38; see also id. at art. 1.
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Customary international law is international law framed by the practices
of nations performed out of a sense of legal obligation.14 Accordingly,
custom may evolve as state practices evolve, so long as the changes are
attributable to a change in expectations of what law requires—opinio
juris.15
The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations refers to
rules of international law drawn from underlying principles of the world’s
major legal systems.16 One example is “due process of law”: most of the
world’s states, including those with the most political and economic
influence, accept the principle that a person is entitled to notice and an
opportunity to be heard before a government takes away his or her liberty or
property.
B. Crimes of Aggression: The History and Current State
This section discusses the history and current state of the crime of
aggression in international law. It first discusses the relevant international
conventions and treaties,17 then customary international law, 18 and finally
the general principles relevant to defining acts of aggression. 19
It is important to note that an act of aggression, as discussed in the U.N.
Charter, and a crime of aggression are two separate and distinct concepts.20
The act is the state-performed violation, while the crime is the individual
criminal liability that the instigator or planner of an act of aggression may
face. 21 While a state commits an act of aggression, an individual commits a
crime of aggression. 22
1. International Conventions and Treaties
As discussed above, international conventions and treaties are the
primary and most widely used international law sources today.23 Both the
crime and act of aggression are codified in two such sources: the U.N.
Charter and the Rome Statute—which set forth the design and jurisdiction
of the ICC.

14. KLABBERS, supra note 2, at 26–27.
15. Jonathan I. Charney, “Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo,” in
Editorial Comments: NATO’s Kosovo Intervention, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 834, 836 (1999).
16. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(1)(c)(4) (1987).
17. See infra Part I.B.1.
18. See infra Part I.B.2.
19. See infra Part I.B.3.
20. Richard L. Griffiths, International Law, the Crime of Aggression and the Ius Ad
Bellum, 2 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 301, 309–10 (2002).
21. Id.
22. Ioana Gabriela Stancu, Defining the Crime of Aggression or Redefining Aggression?,
in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 87, 88 (Mauro
Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2004).
23. See supra Part I.A.
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a. The U.N. Charter
Since its inception after the carnage of World War II, the U.N., through
its founding charter, has made the prevention of “acts of aggression” its
highest priority. Among the “[p]urposes of the United Nations” is “to
maintain international peace and security” by suppressing “acts of
aggression or other breaches of the peace.”24 To this end, article 2 calls
upon members to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against . . . any state” in any manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations. 25
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, comprising articles 39 to 51, gives the
Security Council the power to determine the existence “of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and react appropriately.26
Specifically, article 40 allows the Council, before determining the existence
of an article 39 threat, to demand provisional measures of the relevant states
to cease their offending actions.27 Article 42 allows the Council to
authorize military force “to maintain or restore international peace and
security.”28 Article 51 notes that while nothing in the charter shall impair a
state’s right to self-defense in the event of an armed attack, the Council
reserves the right to take any action to maintain and restore international
peace and security that it sees fit.29
But what exactly is an act of aggression? The U.N. Charter never
specifically defines it,30 though Germany and Japan’s wars of aggression
were certainly the historical precedent the U.N.’s founders had in mind.31
These same founders, however, feared that struggling with a definition
would bring the Charter Conference to a standstill, and so left it to the
Security Council to decide what constitutes the act, a threat to peace, and an
attack on peace on a case-by-case basis.32
b. The Rome Statute and the Kampala Conference Amendments
The Rome Statute is a 2002 international treaty that established the
ICC.33 The treaty vested the ICC with jurisdiction over the crime of

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1.
Id. at art. 2, para. 4.
Id. at art. 39.
Id. at art. 40.
Id. at art. 42.
Id. at art. 51.
Umberto Leanza, The Historical Background, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT AND THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 1, 4 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2004).
While Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter was later used as a basis for an “act of aggression”
definition, there is no indication that this was the intent of the original document.
31. See KEMP, supra note 11, at 104.
32. Id. at 4–5.
33. The Rome Statute came into force on July 1, 2002, the first day of the month after
sixty days from the date the sixtieth state had ratified, accepted, approved, or acceded it. See
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 126, para. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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aggression.34 Some countries such as the United States, the United
Kingdom, and their Western allies opposed the inclusion of the crime in the
court’s jurisdiction in large part because of the potential for their leaders
and generals to be prosecuted for aggression.35 However, a coalition of
many European Union states and approximately thirty members of the
Movement of Non-Aligned Countries made their support of the Rome
Statute contingent on its inclusion. 36 Because of how contentious this issue
was, the conference’s chairman brokered a compromise that asserted
jurisdiction over “crimes of aggression” but left decisions on the crime’s
definition and the details of that jurisdiction to a future conference.37 To
create and research a workable definition, the conference created the
Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (SWGCA) which met
numerous times between 2003 and 2009.38 The 2010 Kampala Conference
largely adopted the working group’s findings into the so-called Kampala
Amendment, but the resulting definition will not go into force until after
approval at another conference to be held before 2017.39
Under the definition adopted at Kampala, an individual can be prosecuted
for a crime of aggression if he or she (1) is “in a position effectively to
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action[s] of a
State” and (2) has been involved in the “planning, preparation, initiation or
execution” of an act of aggression that “by its character, gravity and scale,
constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.”40
The Kampala Amendment further specifies that an act of aggression is
“the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations,” essentially mirroring
the language of U.N. Charter article 2(4).41 The amendment specifically
names the same seven acts listed in UNGA Resolution 3314 (XXIX) as
“acts of aggression.”42
34. Id. at art. 5, para. 1.
35. See infra notes 197–99 and accompanying text.
36. Elise LeClerc-Gagne & Michael Byers, A Question of Intent: The Crime of
Aggression and Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 379, 380
(2009).
37. Noah Weisbord, Prosecuting Aggression, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 161, 171 (2008).
38. International Criminal Court, Assembly of State Parties, Special Working Group on
the Crime of Aggression, 7th Sess., Annex I, ICC-ASP/7/SWGCA/2 (Feb. 20, 2009).
39. Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
Kampala, Uganda, May 31–June 11, 2010, RC/9/11, at 18 (June 11, 2010) [hereinafter
Review Conference], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP9/OR/RC11-ENG.pdf. While this definition is not yet in full force, its adoption by consensus and
imminent re-visitation make it an important text and interpretation to consider when
discussing the crime of aggression.
40. Id.
41. Compare id., with U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations.”).
42. Review Conference, supra note 39, at 18. See infra Part I.B.3.b. for a summary of
the acts.

998

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

Finally, Annex III to the Kampala Amendment contains seven
“Understandings” regarding the amendment’s legal interpretation.43 While
this section is not part of the proposed additions to the Rome Statute’s text,
some negotiating parties insisted on its addition to the annex to clarify
certain sections.44 It is therefore, perhaps, most accurately considered a
form of “soft law.”
Understandings 1 through 5 cover procedural, jurisdictional, and
precedential points. Understandings 1 and 3 specify that the ICC may only
exercise jurisdiction of UNSC-referred and ICC prosecutorial crime of
aggression cases committed after the pre-January 1, 2017 meeting approves
the amendment’s incorporation, or one year after ratification by thirty state
parties. 45 Understanding 2 extends ICC jurisdiction of UNSC-referred
cases to individuals regardless of whether their state has accepted the
court’s jurisdiction.46 Understandings 4 and 5 clarify that the act of
aggression and crime of aggression definitions included in the amendment
are solely for ICC purposes, not for “limiting or prejudicing in any way
existing or developing rules of international law” nor do they create “the
right or obligation” for a state to exercise domestic jurisdiction over an act
of aggression committed by another state.47
In contrast, Understandings 6 and 7 most directly address the definition
of crimes and acts of aggression.48 Understanding 6 notes that aggression is
the “most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force” and that—
in accordance with the U.N. Charter—all circumstances surrounding a
particular case must be considered before determining such an act exists,
including the act’s gravity and consequences.49 Understanding 7 clarifies
the meaning of a “manifest violation” of the U.N. Charter noting that the
three specified components—character, gravity, and scale—must each and
collectively be sufficient to justify the “manifest determination.”50 These
thresholds indicate that not every act of aggression is a basis for criminal
Indeed, the SWGCA meant “manifest” to exclude
prosecution.51
“borderline cases” or “those falling within a grey area” both factually and
legally.52 In other words, where it is debatable that a state’s actions have
43. Review Conference, supra note 39, at 22.
44. Beth Van Schaak, Negotiating at the Interface of Power and Law: The Crime of
Aggression, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 505, 596–97 (2010–11).
45. Review Conference, supra note 39, at 22.
46. Id.
47. Id. This echoes the Nuremberg Military Tribunal’s branding of aggression as the
“supreme international crime.” See infra note 63.
48. Review Conference, supra note 39, at 22.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Joseph M. Isanga, The International Criminal Court Ten Years Later: Appraisal
and Prospects, 21 CARDOZO J. INT’ L & COMP. L. 235, 310 n.368 (2013). This interpretation
is also consistent with the Nuremberg Military Tribunals discussed supra Part I.B.2.a.
52. Jennifer Trahan, The Rome Statute’s Amendment on the Crime of Aggression:
Negotiations at the Kampala Review Conference, 11 INT’L CRIM . L. REV. 49, 58 (2011)
(citing February 2009 SWGCA Meeting, in THE PRINCETON PROCESS ON THE CRIME OF
AGGRESSION: MATERIALS OF THE SPECIAL WORKING GROUP ON THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION
51, 87 (Stefan Barriga, Wolfgang Danspeckgruber & Christian Wenaweser eds., 2009)).
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the sufficient “character” or where they do not meet the required “gravity”
or “scale”, an act is not a manifest violation. 53
It is currently unclear whether the “manifest” test would exclude
borderline cases of humanitarian intervention, for instance, where there was
no prior Security Council approval as was the case with the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 1999 Kosovo bombings. 54 The U.S.
delegation explicitly proposed a humanitarian intervention exception to the
“acts of aggression” definition which would have brought some clarity.55
This proposal was met with “severe reluctance” by many delegates citing
concerns over how to judge “good faith” and time constraints during the
conference.56 The underlying concern was the possibility of pretextual
invocations of humanitarian intervention by powerful states.
2. Customary International Law
This section discusses the customary international law sources which
inform the act of aggression and crime of aggression definitions. It first
considers the precedents set by the International Military Tribunals at
Tokyo and Nuremberg. Second, it looks to aggression as the U.N. Security
Council and the General Assembly have defined it. Finally, it discusses the
International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) treatment of aggression.
a. The History of the Crime of Aggression and
the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo
The genesis of the crime of aggression lies in the 1919 Treaty of
Versailles that ended World War I.57 The treaty called for the former
German Emperor, Kaiser Wilhelm I, to be arraigned and tried before judges
representing the allied powers for “a supreme offence against international
morality and the sanctity of treaties.”58 This inchoate definition can be seen
53. Id.
54. Van Schaak, supra note 44, at 565.
55. C. Kreβ & L. von Holtzendorff, The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of
Aggression, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1179, 1205 (2010). The U.S. proposal for an
understanding read in its entirety:
It is understood that, for the purposes of the Statute, an act cannot be considered to
be a manifest violation of the United Nations Charter unless it would be
objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with
normal practice and in good faith, and thus an act undertaken in connection with
an effort to prevent the commission of any of the crimes contained in Articles 6, 7
or 8 of the Statute would not constitute an act of aggression.
Laurie O’Connor, Humanitarian Intervention and the Crime of Aggression: The Precarious
Position of the “Knights of Humanity” 33–34 (Oct. 15, 2010) (unpublished Bachelor of
Laws dissertation, University of Otago), available at http://www.otago.ac.nz/law/
research/journals/otago036321.pdf.
56. Kreβ & von Holtzendorff, supra note 55, at 1205; O’Connor, supra note 55, at 33–
34.
57. Griffiths, supra note 20, at 303 (“The Treaty of Versailles represents the first
recognition by states that war could be criminally, as well as delictually, wrong.”).
58. Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles) art. 227, June 28, 1919, 2
U.S.T. 43.
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as a predecessor to aggression as it was articulated after World War II and
memorialized in the U.N. Charter. The tribunal was to be “guided by the
highest motives of international policy” and incorporate the “obligations of
international undertakings” and “international morality.”59 The fates,
however, conspired to deny future scholars this precedent: Kaiser
Wilhelm I was given refuge in the Netherlands which refused to extradite
him and the tribunal was never formed. 60
The first actual implementation of crime of aggression prosecution by
international tribunals occurred after World War II. The allied powers
established International Military Tribunals at Tokyo and Nuremberg61 to
hold those deemed war criminals liable for a number of “crimes against
peace” and “war crimes” including waging “wars of aggression.”62 The
Nuremberg court, in language later echoed at Kampala, went so far as to
call instigating a war of aggression “the supreme international crime
differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the
accumulated evil of the whole.”63 The case law of these tribunals remains
the primary and most cited precedent for crime of aggression prosecution,64
and thus warrants a close examination.
Both the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East indicted dozens of former
government and military officials for their involvement in aggressive war.65
The charges against them criminalized both the planning and the active
participation in the aggression.66 Famously, the tribunals rejected the
59. Id.
60. See MARTIN GILBERT, THE FIRST WORLD WAR: A COMPLETE HISTORY 523 (1994).
61. For an extensive account of the legal basis of and innovation that went into the
International Military Tribunals, see NEIL BOISTER & ROBERT CRYER, THE TOKYO
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL: A REAPPRAISAL (2008); KEVIN JON HELLER, THE
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
(2011); and Zachary D. Kaufman, Transitional Justice for Tōjō’s Japan: The United States
Role in the Establishment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and Other
Transitional Justice Mechanisms for Japan After World War II, 27 EMORY INT’ L L. REV. 755
(2013).
62. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East art. 5(a), Jan. 19,
1946, 4 U.S.T. 20 [hereinafter Tokyo Charter] (creating individual responsibility for a
“crime against peace” defined as “the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a
declared or undeclared war of aggression”); Charter of the International Military Tribunal
art. 6(a), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter]
(creating individual responsibility for “crimes against peace” defined as “planning,
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression”).
63. Judicial Decisions: International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), 41 AM. J. INT’L L.
172, 186 (1947).
64. KEMP, supra note 11, at 5.
65. See TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL 27–79
(1947) [hereinafter NUREMBERG TRIAL]; Indictment, in DOCUMENTS ON THE TOKYO
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL: CHARTER, INDICTMENT AND JUDGMENTS 16–33 (Neil
Boister & Robert Cryer eds., 2008) [hereinafter Tokyo Indictment].
66. At the Tokyo Tribunal, Count 1 charged defendants with acting as “leaders,
organizers, instigators, or accomplices” in the “formulation or execution of a common plan
or conspiracy” to wage wars of aggression. Tokyo Indictment, supra note 65, at 18. The
other aggression-related counts on which the accused were convicted were waging a “war of
aggression and a war in violation of international law, treaties, agreements and assurances,
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defense that charged actions were committed under the orders of superiors67
in holding with the scope of their official duties.68
Because the judgments against the accused included the totality of so
many different actions—and because the judgments are worded in a way
that does not differentiate between the aggression and non-aggression
counts—it is hard to isolate the specific acts that could trigger criminal
liability.69
It is useful, however, to look at the actions of those acquitted to see what
did not constitute sufficient grounds to be liable for aggression. At Tokyo,
Iwane Matsui was the only defendant completely acquitted on all
aggression charges against him. 70 Although a general in the Japanese Army
and, therefore, so closely associated with those who conceived and carried
out the conspiracy to commit aggression that he “must have been aware” of
their intentions, the court held that this mere association was insufficient to
brand him as a conspirator.71 Similarly, merely carrying out his duties as a
military officer in waging an aggressive war was insufficient to convict him
for waging aggression since the prosecution never proved he had
knowledge of the “criminal character of the war.”72 From these holdings,
we can ascertain that only those involved in higher level planning than that
of a field general and with the knowledge of aggressive intent—not simply
carrying out their duties—are liable for the “crime of aggression.”
The tribunals at Nuremberg support these conclusions. There, ten
defendants were completely acquitted of aggression charges.73 Martin
Bormann, Chief of Staff at the Office of the Führer’s Deputy, was acquitted
of participation in the conspiracy since his knowledge of the conspiracy was
never proven, nor could it be conclusively inferred from the positions that
he held.74 Hans Fritzsche, Head of the Radio Propaganda Ministry, was
against” various allied nations. Id. at 25–26 (counts 27, 29, 31–33, 35). Count 36, concerning
aggression actions against the USSR and Mongolia, includes the language “war of
aggression in violation of international law, treaties, agreements and assurances.” Id.
(emphasis added). At Nuremberg, the accused were charged and convicted with two
aggression-related counts. Count 1 indicted those who participated “as leaders, organizers,
instigators, or accomplices” in a conspiracy to plan, prepare, initiate, or wage “wars of
aggression, which were also wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, or
assurances.” NUREMBERG TRIAL, supra note 65, at 29. Count 2 charged the indicted with
actually participating in the “planning, preparation, initiation, and waging of wars of
aggression, which were also wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and
assurances.” Id. at 42.
67. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 62, at art. 8; Tokyo Charter, supra note 62, at art. 6.
68. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 62, at art. 7; Tokyo Charter, supra note 62, at art. 6.
69. See Majority Judgment: Verdicts, in DOCUMENTS ON THE TOKYO INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL: CHARTER, INDICTMENT AND JUDGMENTS 598–628 (Neil Boister &
Robert Cryer eds., 2008) [hereinafter Tokyo Verdicts].
70. See id.; see also app. 1.
71. Tokyo Verdicts, supra note 69, at 612.
72. Id.
73. See app. 1. Although Hans Frank and Fritz Sauckel were acquitted of their
aggression crimes, available records give insufficient detail to identify specifics. Thus, they
are not included in the following analysis. NUREMBERG TRIAL, supra note 65, at 296 (Frank
indictment), 320 (Sauckel indictment).
74. Id. at 338–39.
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acquitted of the conspiracy charges since he never gained “sufficient stature
to attend the planning conferences which led to aggressive war” and had no
control over propaganda policies. 75 Ernst Kaltenbrunner, a general officer
in the Schutzstaffel (SS), was acquitted even though the prosecution had
proven he committed an aggressive act because this act was not considered
part of the aggressive war.76
Hjalmar Schacht, President of the Reichsbank and Minister without
Portfolio, was acquitted both on conspiracy and execution counts—despite
being actively involved in German rearmament—because the prosecution
never proved that (1) he was aware the rearmament was going to be used in
aggressive wars and (2) he was close enough to the conspiracy to know of
the aggressive war or influence its plans.77 Moreover, his actions
(1) incorporating Austrian and Czech banks after annexation, (2) setting
exchange rates, and (3) making violent pro-Nazi speeches were judged as
insufficient to qualify as participation in the conspiracy to commit
aggressive war.78
Albert Speer, Minister of Armaments and War Production, was acquitted
on both aggression charges against him since his activities directing
Germany’s armament industry were judged insufficient to be considered
participating in the conspiracy or the waging of aggressive wars.79 The
court reasoned that since he did not become head of the armament industry
until after all aggressive wars had been initiated, his management “of
German armament production [was] in aid of the war effort in the same way
that other productive enterprises aid in the waging of war.”80 The tribunal
was not prepared to declare all such activities as qualifying as engaging in
aggressive war.81
Julius Streicher was acquitted since he was never in Hitler’s inner circle
and there was no proof he had ever attended important conferences at which
others planned the war or that he had knowledge of the created policies.82
The court found that while Franz von Papen—Germany’s foreign
representative in Vienna—engaged in “intrigue and bullying” which aided
in the occupation of Austria, there was no evidence he was party to the
plans that identified Austrian occupation as the first step in an aggressive
war, nor was there evidence that he participated in the plans to occupy that
country by aggressive war if necessary.83
Baldur von Schirach—leader of Nazi youth group “Youth in the German
Reich”—was actively involved in the militarization, pre-military training,
and radicalization of Germany’s youth. 84 Despite this, the court found that
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 336–37.
Id. at 291–93.
Id. at 307–10.
Id. at 309–10.
Id. at 330–31.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 301–02.
Id. at 326–27.
Id. at 317–18.
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he was not involved in the aggressive war conspiracy since he was not
directly involved in Hitler’s plans for territorial expansion.85
These cases inform the following guiding principles. First, aggressive
acts are separate from aggressive war and merely carrying out or being
otherwise involved in the act is insufficient to convict for the criminal
aggression.86 Secondly, not all actions in aid of an aggressive war effort are
necessary to its planning qualify as the crime of aggression. 87 Specifically,
carrying out a general officer’s duties,88 being involved in the industrial
planning that allows for rearmament,89 carrying out the financial
transactions necessary for rearmament and the incorporation of annexed
states,90 advancing propaganda,91 administrative work, 92 youth
radicalization and militarization,93 and foreign affairs intrigue94 are all—in
and of themselves—insufficient.
Third, criminal liability requires
conclusive evidence of (1) active participation in supporting the war of
aggression and (2) knowledge of the aggressive nature of the war, either
through direct involvement in the planning or otherwise.95 This second
element appears to be the far more difficult of the two to prove since the
prosecution could not do it for even high-ranking officials.
While these tribunals were the first recognition that aggression was an
offense, the allied powers alleged that these crimes and their prosecution
were based on international law as it existed in 1939.96 This contention
may have been debatable in the late-1940s, but today, the decisions of these
tribunals and other subsequent developments make criminal liability for
aggression an unquestionable part of current customary international law.97
b. UNSC Aggression Determinations
The Security Council enjoys the power to determine “the existence of
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”98 Since
the U.N. Charter uses these three separate terms it is reasonable to assume
85. Id.
86. Id. at 291 (distinguishing the Anschluss as an “aggressive act” but not an “aggressive
war” and acquitting Kaltenbrunner on conspiracy to commit aggressive war charges despite
his involvement).
87. See supra notes 71–82 and accompanying text.
88. Tokyo Verdicts, supra note 69, at 611–12 (Matsui).
89. NUREMBERG TRIAL, supra note 66, at 307–09 (Schacht), 330–31 (Speer).
90. Id. at 307–09 (Schacht).
91. Id. at 336–37 (Fritzsche).
92. Id. at 338–39 (Bormann).
93. Id. at 317–18 (von Schirach).
94. Id. at 326–27 (von Papen).
95. CODIFICATION DIV., U.N. OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, HISTORICAL REVIEW OF
DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION 74 (2003) [hereinafter U.N. AGGRESSION]; see
also Tokyo Verdicts, supra note 69, at 611–12 (Matsui).
96. Griffiths, supra note 20, at 307.
97. Id. at 307–08. Additionally, UNGA resolution 95 (I) unanimously sanctioned the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the decisions issued by the tribunal. Leanza, supra
note 30, at 3–4; see also LeClerc-Ganges & Byers, supra note 36, at 379–80.
98. U.N. Charter art. 39.
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that they are meant to have different meanings and, thus, that they cover
different actions and levels of severity.99 Their separate usage as such
across the U.N. Charter and General Assembly resolutions further supports
such an interpretation.100 Original intent and subsequent usage in
international law indicate that only the most severe actions qualify as acts
of aggression. 101 Therefore, in theory, there exists a hierarchy among the
three Security Council determinable offenses: a “threat to peace” is roughly
equivalent to a threat to use force, a “breach of the peace” is an actual use
of force or the consequences of a threat that have tangible results negatively
affecting international peace and security, and an act of aggression is
reserved for the most serious “breaches of the peace.”102
In practice, the Security Council has defined “acts of aggression” quite
differently. 103 Notably, the Security Council has never used General
Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) in defining aggression. 104 While most
condemnations were aimed at a series of general, unspecified acts, the
specifically condemned acts reveal a set of actions which the Security
Council believes constitute an act of aggression.105 These include: an
operation in which six aircrafts dropped five bombs in an airstrike, a small
arms attack on a presidential palace and an airport, an attack against another
nation’s capital which used small arms and bombs to kill twelve, two
targeted assassinations and collateral loss of life, violence against
diplomatic missions, and “armed invasions.”106 The action most common
to these aggressive acts is the use of armed force against the victim state’s
territorial integrity.107 Such actions, especially the targeted assassinations,
fall far below the threshold that the textual definition of “acts of aggression”
would suggest.108
This list excludes several state actions that would seem unambiguous
examples of aggression, including the Korean War, the Iran-Iraq War, the
Falklands War, and several Israeli operations.109 This failure either resulted
from aborted attempts at resolutions or a failure to even consider the
situations.110
99. CARRIE MCDOUGALL, THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 65 (2013). Such a conclusion derives from a plain reading
of the text as the Vienna Convention requires. See supra Part I.A.
100. MCDOUGALL, supra note 99, at 65.
101. Id. at 66–68.
102. Id. at 67–70.
103. See R. BELLELLI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE : LAW AND PRACTICE FROM THE
ROME STATUTE TO ITS REVIEW 507–10 (2010) (compilation of UNSC resolutions that have
used “aggression”); O. SOLERA, DEFINING THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 201 (2007); Weisbord,
supra note 37, at 169. McDougall argues that though the Security Council has used the word
“aggression,” it is difficult to conclude that they have ever made an article 39 determination.
See MCDOUGALL, supra note 99, at ch. 6.
104. MCDOUGALL, supra note 99, at 83.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 84–85.
107. Id. at 85.
108. Id. at 86.
109. Weisbord, supra note 37, at 169.
110. Id.
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Additionally, the list of “acts of aggression” betrays an extreme
selectivity as to which countries the UNSC chooses to denounce.111 Out of
the twenty resolutions, ten denounced apartheid South Africa, six were
directed at the “racist regime” in Southern Rhodesia, two described and
denounced Israel, one was against a multinational mercenary force, and one
was against Iraq.112 The evidentiary record indicates that the Security
Council’s use of aggression is more political and rhetorical than legal, and
therefore, perhaps too unreliable to be of use in legal proceedings.
c. UNGA Aggression Determinations
The UNGA also has branded actions as aggression in its own resolutions.
Though they do not enjoy the binding “law” status of Security Council
resolutions, they are admissible as empirical evidence of customary
international law. Resolution 498 (V) found that China’s intervention in the
Korean War, as well as the actions of those it was supporting, constituted
aggression.113
Resolution 1899 (XVIII) condemned South African
incursions into South West Africa saying that “any attempt to annex a part
or the whole of the Territory of South West Africa constitutes an act of
aggression.”114 In Resolution S-9/2 the UNGA denounced South Africa’s
illegal occupation of Namibia and interference in Angola and Zambia as
acts of aggression. 115 The UNGA applied its 1974 definition of aggression
to find the following South African acts of aggression against Namibia:
illegal and colonial occupation in defiance of past UNGA and UNSC
resolutions, military attacks against other African states launched from
Namibia, specific attacks on Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe, and its partial occupation of Angola.116 It further declared the
following South African actions to constitute aggression: attempts to
“annex or encroach upon the territorial integrity of [Basutoland,
Bechuanaland and Swaziland]” (1962),117 armed intervention in Southern
Rhodesia (1969),118 raiding Matola, Mozambique (January 1981) and
invading Angola (July 1981) and the Seychelles (November 1981),119
military aggression against Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique,
Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe,120 continued occupation of
Angola and armed aggression against Lesotho and Mozambique,121 and

111. Id.
112. See U.N. AGGRESSION, supra note 95, at 225–37; Weisbord, supra note 37, at 169.
113. U.N. AGGRESSION, supra note 95, at 242.
114. Id. at 242–43 (quoting G.A. Res. 1889 (XVIII), U.N. Doc. A/5605 (Nov. 6, 1963)).
115. Id. at 243.
116. Id. at 243–44.
117. Id. at 245 (citing G.A. Res. 1954 (XVII), at 8, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., 1277th plen.
mtg. U.N. Doc. A/L.441 (Dec. 11, 1963)).
118. Id. (citing G.A. Res. 2508 (XXIV), U.N. Doc. A/7759 (Nov. 21, 1969)).
119. Id. (citing G.A. Res. 36/172C, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/172[C] (Dec. 17, 1981)).
120. Id. (citing G.A. Res. 38/14, annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/38/14 (Nov. 22, 1983)).
121. Id. (citing G.A. Res. 38/39C, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/39[C] (Dec. 5, 1983)).
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overt and covert actions to destabilize neighboring states and attacks against
South African and Namibian refugees.122
In the 1970s the General Assembly passed three resolutions condemning
Portuguese aggression for its illegal occupation of parts of Guinea-Bissau
and repeated military actions against Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.123
Finally, the General Assembly has branded several Israeli actions acts of
aggression. These include: “any military occupation, however temporary,
or any forcible annexation of such territory [Palestine], or part thereof, as an
act of aggression” and continuing actions there,124 its attack against Iraqi
nuclear facilities,125 its June 1982 invasion of Lebanon, and its occupation
of the Golan Heights.126
Finally, the General Assembly condemned Serbia and Montenegro’s
1992 military incursions into Bosnia and Herzegovina as “aggressive
acts.”127
Again, these designations betray a preference toward finding acts of
aggression when a state has violated another’s territorial sovereignty and,
again, they concentrate on particular pariah or politically targeted states.128
Thus, the UNGA too seems an inapt institution for generating a definition
of the crime of aggression that is fair to potential defendants and can serve
to guide prosecutions in an even-handed way.
d. International Court of Justice and the Act of Aggression
The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations.129 As such, its findings and decisions contribute to the
international legal standard.130 The court has twice taken legal disputes
implicating alleged acts of aggression. 131
The first was Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (1986),132 a case concerning Nicaraguan allegations that the
United States had perpetrated armed attacks against it in violation of
122. Id. (citing G.A. Res. 39/72G, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/72[G] (Dec. 13, 1984)).
123. Id. at 246–47 (citing G.A. Res. 2795 (XXVI), U.N. Doc. A/8549 (Dec. 10, 1971);
G.A. Res. 3061 (XXVIII), at 2–3, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., 2163rd plen. mtg. U.N. Doc.
A/L.702 (Nov. 2, 1973)) U.N. Doc. A/RES/3061 (Nov. 2, 1973); and G.A. Res. 3113
(XXVIII), U.N. Doc. A/9338 (Dec. 12, 1973)).
124. Id. at 247 (citing G.A. Res. 3414 (XXX), at 6-7, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., 2429th
plen. mtg. U.N. Doc. A/L.783 (Dec. 5, 1975)).
125. Id. at 248.
126. Id. at 249–50.
127. Id. at 250–51.
128. See supra notes 102–07 and accompanying text.
129. U.N. Charter art. 92. The court is authorized to make legal advisory opinions when
the UNGA, UNSC, or a UNGA-authorized entity requests it. Id. at art. 96. In practice, these
cases often involve international disputes between states. For a list of such cases, see
Contentious Cases, INT’L COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3.
130. See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text.
131. U.N. AGGRESSION, supra note 95, at 262–63.
132. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14 (June 27). For a detailed discussion of this case and its ramifications on the crime
of aggression, see MCDOUGALL, supra note 99, at 68–69.
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international law. 133 Two parts of the ICJ decision are relevant to clarifying
the legal concept of “aggression.” Firstly, the court held that the definition
of aggression contained in Resolution 3314 (XXIX) article (3), section (g)
was “customary international law,” increasing the Resolution’s importance
and visibility.134 Second, the court emphasized that not all uses of force
constituted aggression when it differentiated the concept from “less grave
forms of the use of force.”135 In so doing, it gave support to the
aforementioned use of force hierarchy and legal consequences.136
In Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (2005),137 the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) accused Uganda of committing
acts of aggression against its territory when it invaded, attacked, and
occupied DRC territory in violation of Resolution 3314 (XXIX)’s article 1
and the U.N. Charter’s article 2. 138 While the court used the same part of
Resolution 3314 it had used in the Nicaragua case to conclude that the
DRC had sent no armed bands or irregulars against Uganda, its final
judgment made no specific determination on acts of aggression.139
3. General Principles: The Struggle to Define Aggression
In addition to Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and
ICJ decisions, the young United Nations initiated two committees
concerned in whole or in part with defining the crime of aggression. These
committees were the International Law Commission (ILC) and a group that
General Assembly Resolution 2230 created to define both the act and crime
of aggression.140
a. The ILC Path
In the years following World War II, the U.N. sought to create a
permanent court—on the model of the Tokyo and Nuremberg tribunals—
that would hold leaders criminally liable for violations of international
law. 141 To that end, General Assembly Resolution 378/B (V) in November
1950 created the ILC and charged it with producing an international
criminal code. 142 As early as 1954, its draft code of international crimes

133. U.N. AGGRESSION, supra note 95, at 262.
134. Id. at 263; see also Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 195.
135. MCDOUGALL, supra note 99, at 68 (citing Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 191) (“Alongside
certain descriptions which may refer to aggression, this text includes others which refer only
to less grave forms of the use of force.”).
136. Id.
137. (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168 (Dec. 19).
138. U.N. AGGRESSION, supra note 95, at 263–64.
139. Congo, 2005 I.C.J. at 223, 280–83.
140. Oscar Solera, The Definition of the Crime of Aggression: Lessons Not Learned, 42
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 801, 805–06 (2010).
141. Id.
142. Kari M. Fletcher, Defining the Crime of Aggression: Is There an Answer to the
International Criminal Court’s Dilemma?, 65 A.F. L. REV. 229, 239 (2010); Leanza, supra
note 30, at 5.
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included individual liability for committing “acts of aggression.”143 The
ILC was soon blocked from fulfilling its mandate, however, amid the early
Cold War’s tense political climate and both Soviet and American concerns
over how international prosecution would undermine sovereignty.144 The
lofty goals of defining these contentious legal issues lay dormant until 1996
when, in a more favorable political climate, the ILC was reinstated and
issued a draft code. 145 The draft drew upon the Nuremberg judgment and
the U.N. Charter as the “main sources of authority with regard to individual
criminal responsibility for acts of aggression,” but ignored the 1974 General
Assembly definition146 which it considered “overly political” and lacking in
legal precision. 147
The ILC definition states that “[a]n individual who, as the leader or
organizer, actively participates in or orders the planning, preparation,
initiation or waging of aggression committed by a State shall be responsible
for a crime of aggression.”148 The body did not attempt to define
“aggression committed by a State,” finding it “beyond the scope of the
code.”149
b. The Path to Resolution 3314
Partially in recognition that its original hopes for an ILC definition had
become a lost cause, the General Assembly created a separate committee
charged with crafting a definition of acts and crimes of aggression. 150 The
committee’s efforts were formalized in December 1974 with UNGA
Resolution 3314 (XXIX).151 That resolution defined aggression as “the use
of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Charter of the United Nations.”152 In an unprecedented attempt at
an explicit definition, the resolution lists seven specific acts that qualify as
prima facie acts of aggression: (1) the invasion, attack, occupation, or
annexation of another state’s territory, (2) the bombardment by the armed
forces of a state against the territory of another state, (3) “the blockade of
the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State,” (4) any
attack by the armed forces of one state against another state’s armed forces,
(5) the use of armed forces by one state against those of another state whose
forces had been invited by a receiving third state, (6) a state allowing a
second state to use its territory to attack a third state, and (7) a state sending
143. Fletcher, supra note 142, at 237–39.
144. Id. at 237; Leanza, supra note 30, at 6.
145. Fletcher, supra note 142, at 239.
146. See supra Part I.B.3.b.
147. Weisbord, supra note 37, at 170 (quoting Report of the International Law
Commission, 48th Sess. Supp. No. 10, May 6–July 26, 1996, at 83–85, U.N. Doc. A/51/10
(Jan. 1, 1996) [hereinafter ILC Report]).
148. Id.
149. ILC Report, supra note 147, at 42–43.
150. Leanza, supra note 30, at 6.
151. Id.
152. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/9890 (Dec. 14, 1974).
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“armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries” against another state.153
Additionally, the resolution notes that “[n]o consideration of whatever
nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a
justification for aggression.”154 Under the procedure set forth in the
resolution, these acts would only be considered “acts of aggression” after
the Security Council had so determined them.155
Finally, the resolution states that a “war of aggression is a crime against
international peace” giving rise to international responsibility.156 The
resolution is, however, silent on the matter of whether any of the above
“acts of aggression” would constitute a “war of aggression” or to what
extent international responsibility would be incurred.157 In light of the
differences between the terms, their usage in other documents, and their
differentiation in this document, the two seem to be distinct.
This definition gained prominence when the ICC adopted it to define
“acts of aggression” as a prerequisite for the “crime of aggression.”158
c. Aggression in Domestic Law
The crime of aggression has found further recognition in the general
principles of civilized states through domestic legal rulings. The United
Kingdom’s House of Lords considered it in R v. Jones and Others.159 In
that case, two peace activists used a 1977 law—which provided that a
person may use reasonable force to prevent a crime—as a defense against
criminal charges for breaking into a British military base to damage fuel
tankers and, in so doing, preventing what they considered a crime of
aggression against Iraq.160 While the court acknowledged the crime of
aggression as a part of international law, it refused to recognize the crime as
part of British criminal law without further legislative approval.161
d. Ad Hoc Trials: A Lack of Aggression Considerations
The crime of aggression proved entirely absent from twentieth century ad
hoc trials.162 For instance, the United Nations created ad hoc international
criminal tribunals in both Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia to address
past atrocities.163 The tribunals were based on the precedent cases at

153. Id.
154. Id. at 143–44.
155. The UNSC may decide that the acts or their consequences are not of “sufficient
gravity” to be “acts of aggression.” Id. at 143.
156. Id. at 144.
157. Id.
158. See supra Part I.B.1.b (discussing Kampala definitions).
159. Weisbord, supra note 37, 172–73 (citing R v. Jones, [2006] UKHL 16 (appeal taken
from Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2006/16.html).
160. Id. at 172.
161. Id. at 173.
162. Id. at 169.
163. Id. at 169–70.
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Nuremberg.164 Despite the World War II tribunals’ focus on aggression, no
individual in either one of the modern tribunals was indicted on crimes of
aggression.165 The courts instead chose to focus on genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes, possibly because both situations
primarily involved “intra-national” rather than “international violence.”166
In the First Gulf War—a conflict unambiguously involving international
violence—while coalition forces considered holding Iraqi leader Saddam
Hussein criminally liable for his invasion of Kuwait, the plan ultimately fell
through.167 While the reasons behind this failure remain unclear, it seems
that coalition forces may have decided that international sanctions against
Iraq were a more fitting punishment than deposing and prosecuting the
nation’s leader.168 A similar effort after the Second Gulf War was foiled
when the Attorney General for England and Wales deemed the possibility
of prosecution for the crime of aggression to be “remote” and due to
political concerns in the U.S. and U.K. that prosecuting Hussein for
aggression might eventually set a precedent that could be used against
coalition participants.169
C. Bona Fide Humanitarian Intervention
This Note is limited to “bona fide” forcible humanitarian intervention,
also known as “unilateral humanitarian intervention.”170 Such action is
defined as when a state (or group of states) uses military force against
another state for the primary purpose of preventing widespread deprivations
of human rights.171 Further, because intervention that is invited, Security
Council-approved, or in self-defense is widely considered legal under
international law172—and thus unlikely to be considered aggression in the
first place—this Note deals only with circumstances where the UNSC has

164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 170. Weisbord also suggests that declining to tackle the crime of aggression at
these tribunals was a UNSC acknowledgement of its “poor track record at fulfilling its
essential function: to prevent aggression and mass violence.” Id.
167. Id. at 169.
168. Id.
169. See William A. Schabas, Issue #15: Should Saddam Hussein Be Prosecuted for the
Crime of Aggression?, GROTIAN MOMENT BLOG (Oct. 19, 2005), http://www.law.case.edu/
Academics/AcademicCenters/Cox/GrotianMomentBlog/TabId/861/ArtMID/1996/ArticleID/
45/Issue-15-Should-Saddam-Hussein-be-Prosecuted-for-the-Crime-of-Aggression.aspx.
170. Sean D. Murphy, Criminalizing Humanitarian Intervention, 41 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 341, 341 (2009).
171. See id.
172. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state.”); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 72
(2011) (arguing that the Charter forbids “inter-State force” except in cases of self defense or
where authorized by the Security Council). But see JULIUS STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD
ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF UNITED NATIONS THEORIES OF AGGRESSION 43 (1958) (arguing that
the U.N. Charter only prohibits use of force aimed at violating “territorial integrity and
political independence”).
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been somehow prevented from solving the situation through its available
means.
NATO’s actions in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s are the
seminal and most often used case to demonstrate such intervention.173
During that campaign, NATO forces bombed Serbian militants and the
Federal Yugoslav Republic Army in an effort to stop their murder of
Kosovar Albanians.174 A Security Council sponsored action was not
possible due to the ever-present threat of a Russian veto to protect their
Serbian allies.175 Although many, both at the time and since, have decried
the NATO campaign as a gross violation of international law,176 formal
international legal channels mostly remained silent on the matter.177 Three
days after NATO started its campaign, for instance, the UNSC refused a
request to condemn the military action.178 After the bombing campaign and
the peace that followed, an attempted UNSC resolution condemning
NATO’s actions was overwhelmingly rejected by a vote of twelve-tothree. 179 The UNSC actually tacitly approved NATO’s actions in its
Resolution 1244 which endorsed an “international armed presence” in postconflict Kosovo and authorized it to exercise “all necessary means to fulfill
its responsibilities.”180
Whether unilateral humanitarian intervention, in general, is legal in
international law falls outside the purview of this Note because states
powerful enough to conduct such intervention have proven themselves
willing to use such force even when that use is widely considered illegal.181
173. See, e.g., Christopher P. DeNicola, A Shield for the “Knights of Humanity”: The
ICC Should Adopt a Humanitarian Necessity Defense to the Crime of Aggression, 30 U. PA.
J. INT’L L. 641, 660 (2008).
174. INDEP. INT’L COMM’N ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT (2000), available at
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/F62789D9FCC56FB3C1256C1700303
E3B-thekosovoreport.htm.
175. See O’Connor, supra note 55, at 40 n.199.
176. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, “Kosovo and the Law of ‘Humanitarian Intervention,’” in
Editorial Comments: NATO’s Kosovo Intervention, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 824, 826 (1999).
177. See Ruth Wedgewood, “NATO’s Campaign in Kosovo,” in Editorial Comments:
NATO’s Kosovo Intervention, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 824, 830–31 (1999).
178. See id.
179. See DeNicola, supra note 173, at 660; Wedgewood, supra note 177, at 830–31.
180. Wedgewood, supra note 177, at 830.
181. Aaron Schwabach, Kosovo: Virtual War and International Law, 15 L. &
LITERATURE 1, 11 (2003) (noting that NATO states involved in the humanitarian
intervention in Kosovo provided no legal basis for their actions at an ICJ case brought
against them and suffered no economic or military punishments as a result of their
participation). For further discussion on the legality of humanitarian intervention, see KEMP,
supra note 11, at 64–70 (discussing international legal justifications of international law);
Klinton W. Alexander, NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo: The Legal Case for Violating
Yugoslavia’s National Sovereignty in the Absence of Security Council Approval, 22 HOUS. J.
INT’L L. 403, 449 (2000) (arguing that the intervention was legal); Ryan Goodman,
Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 107, 108–12 (2006)
(noting that over 130 states have declared unilateral humanitarian intervention illegal
through international statements); Griffiths, supra note 20, at 348–55 (summarizing the
arguments of both sides before concluding against legality); Henkin, supra note 176, at 824–
28 (arguing for legality); Thomas H. Lee, The Law of War and the Responsibility to Protect
Civilians: A Reinterpretation, 55 HARV. INT’ L L.J. 251 (2014) (arguing that customary
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Relevant, however, is whether the heads of state and government officials
who plan and execute unilateral humanitarian intervention could be liable
for a “crime of aggression.”182
Under current international law, the answer is unclear.183 While the
planning and execution could be analogized to the Tokyo and Nuremberg
defendants, and they are certainly comparable to acts that the Security
Council has branded “aggressive,” their determinations have been applied
too inconsistently for a clear determination to be made.184 This threat of
criminal liability could deter such intervention altogether allowing
humanity’s most vulnerable groups to suffer or be slaughtered. 185
II. THE POSSIBLE LEGAL SOLUTIONS TO BALANCE HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION WITH THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION
This part examines five possible solutions to the aforementioned
ambiguities, allowing the crime of aggression to be prosecuted while
exempting bona fide humanitarian interventions. The solutions discussed
here are both procedural186—redefining the crime of aggression’s
prosecutorial processes—and substantive—discussing the possible
definitions themselves. 187
A. Substantive Solutions
There are two substantive solutions: strictly adhering either to the ICC’s
Kampala Amendment or the definitions in UNGA Resolution 3314 and
prosecuting accordingly.
1. Change ICC’s Kampala Amendment
One possible solution to the problematic definition would be to give the
ICC absolute jurisdiction over determining and prosecuting crimes of
aggression. This would allow the court to determine and investigate prima
facie acts of aggression for possible criminal liability free from Security

international law permits a sovereign state to use armed force to protect civilians facing
imminent risk of group extermination in another sovereign state without UNSC authorization
or self-defense justification); Mary Ellen O’Connell & Mirakmal Niyazmatov, What Is
Aggression?: Comparing the Jus Ad Bellum and the ICC Statute, 10 J. INT’L JUST. 189, 202
n.68 (2012) (arguing that there is no right of humanitarian intervention without Security
Council approval or self-defense necessity); Joshua L. Root, “First Do No Harm”:
Interpreting the Crime of Aggression to Exclude Humanitarian Intervention, 2 U. BALT. J.
INT’L L. 63 (2014) (arguing that bona fide humanitarian intervention is not a use of force
prevented by U.N. Charter article 2(4)).
182. See, e.g., DeNicola, supra note 173; Murphy, supra note 170, at 341; O’Connor,
supra note 55; Root, supra note 181; Beth Van Schaack, The Crime of Aggression and
Humanitarian Intervention on Behalf of Women, 11 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 477 (2011).
183. See supra note 182.
184. See supra Part I.B.1.a.
185. Weisbord, supra note 37, at 220.
186. See infra Part II.B.
187. See infra Part II.A.
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Council interference. 188
Under its current “crimes of aggression”
definition, the court would follow the guidance of UNGA Resolution 3314
(XXIX)and then, through its own systems, determine which cases were
severe enough to meet the necessary “manifest” threshold and prosecute
individuals involved in the planning and execution accordingly. 189
Commentators have argued that there are a host of potential benefits to
this plan. 190 First, they argue that the ICC has already been set up and
gained a degree of international legitimacy.191 A majority of the world’s
nations have accepted its authority, and cases are already being tried under
its auspices.192 Second, it eventually would provide a clear jurisprudence
that would clarify for government actors the specific actions that could
incur a crime of aggression indictment. 193 Finally, the ICC is a court of law
which can provide defendants with a fair investigation, indictment, and
trial.194
Others, however, note that numerous factors complicate any ICC attempt
to exempt unilateral humanitarian intervention. First, the current crime of
aggression definition suffers from a distinct lack of clarity for humanitarian
intervention purposes. 195 Under the existing definitions, any bona fide
humanitarian intervention would almost certainly qualify as a prima facie
act of aggression under Resolution 3314’s list.196 Secondly, the ICC’s
future use and legitimacy is far from a foregone conclusion since seventyfive states have yet to ratify the Rome Statute.197 These include China,
India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States—some of the
world’s most militarily and economically powerful states.198 The United
States’ refusal to sign on and subsequent active efforts to undermine the
ICC have garnered the most attention.199
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See supra Part I.B.1.b.
See supra Part I.B.1.b.
See, e.g., O’Connor, supra note 55; Van Schaak, supra note 44.
See, e.g., Van Schaak, supra note 44, at 508–10.
U.N. Treaty Collections—The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
UNITED NATIONS (Jan. 2, 2014, 5:55 PM), http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?
src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10&chapter=18&lang=en.
193. Mugambi Jouet, Reconciling the Conflicting Rights of Victims and Defendants at the
International Criminal Court, 26 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 249, 250 (2007).
194. Id. at 251.
195. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
196. O’Connor, supra note 55, at 22–23.
197. See supra note 192.
198. See supra note 192. For a discussions of country-specific objections, see Anthony
Cullen, The Definition of Non-International Armed Conflict in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court: An Analysis of the Threshold of Application Contained in
Article 8(2)(f), 12 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 419 (2007) (generally); Guan Jing, The ICC’s
Jurisdiction over War Crimes in Internal Armed Conflicts: An Insurmountable Obstacle for
China’s Accession?, 28 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 703 (2010) (China); Mark D. Kielsgard, War
on the International Criminal Court, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 1 (2005) (United States); Jianping
Lu & Zhixiang Wang, China’s Attitude Towards the ICC, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 608, 611–12
(2005) (China); Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov, The ICC and Russian Constitutional Problems,
3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 621 (2005) (Russia).
199. See, e.g., Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of
Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 510 (2003);

1014

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

Furthermore, even existing ratifiers have criticized the court. In 2013,
the African Union (AU) held a special meeting to address the ICC’s
perceived anti-African bias and consider whether all thirty-four of the AU
states that have ratified the Rome Statutes should withdraw from the treaty
all together.200 While no such withdrawal came about, the AU did agree to
a resolution stating that no sitting African head of state should be made to
appear before the court and demanded that existing Kenyan President
Uhuru Kenyatta’s ICC case be deferred, effectively undermining the ICC’s
authority. 201
Finally, as the proposed amendment is written, it is unclear how an act of
aggression could become something severe enough to be prosecutable. A
particular concern is the term “character” which some scholars argue is
unclear beyond meaning separate from a “violation of the Charter,”202
while others have called it effectively meaningless and at the complete
discretion of the court.203 Still others have criticized the lack of definition
for “manifest” within the charter and called the “gravity” and “scale”
criteria inadequate since they provide nothing but a highly subjective
threshold test,204 while another has called it “particularly vague.”205
Additionally, scholars question both the validity and usefulness of the
“Understandings.”206
Additionally, the court’s legal interaction with the Security Council is
extremely ambiguous. 207 Though it was the clear intention of numerous
David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court, 35 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 47 (2002); Meghan E. Lantto, The United States and the International Criminal
Court: A Permanent Divide?, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’ L L. REV. 619 (2008). Of particular
note is the so-called Hague Invasion Act, a federal law that, along with restrictions on
international peacekeeping and military aid for ICC countries who refuse to exempt
American military personnel from extradition, allows the President to use “all means
necessary and appropriate to bring about the release of any [US or allied personnel] being
detained or imprisoned by, on behalf of, or at the request of the International Criminal
Court.” See American Service-Members’ Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7402, 7424, 7427
(2012).
200. James Bullock, AU and the ICC—How They Voted, THINK AFRICA PRESS (Oct. 15,
2013), http://thinkafricapress.com/legal/au-and-icc-how-they-voted.
201. Mark Doyle, African Union Urges ICC to Defer Uhuru Kenyatta Case, BBC NEWS
(Oct. 12, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24506006. Kenya’s parliament
had already voted to withdraw from the ICC a month prior to the meeting. Gabriel
Gatehouse, Kenya MPs Vote to Withdraw from ICC, BBC NEWS (Sept. 5, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-23969316.
202. O’Connell & Niyazmatov, supra note 181, at 204.
203. Andreas Paulus, Second Thoughts on the Crime of Aggression, 20 EURO. J. INT’L L.
1117, 1121 (2010).
204. Solera, supra note 140, at 808.
205. O’Connor, supra note 55, at 35.
206. See supra notes 43–56 and accompanying text; see also David Scheffer, The
Complex Crime of Aggression Under the Rome Statute, 43 STUD. TRANSNAT’L LEGAL POL’Y
173, 180 (2011); Kevin Jon Heller, Are the Aggression “Understandings” Valid?, OPINIO
JURIS (June 16, 2010, 1:25 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/06/16/are-the-aggressionunderstandings-valid/; Marko Milanovic, Marko Milanovic on Understandings, OPINIO JURIS
(June 16, 2010, 7:39 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/06/16/marko-milanovic-onunderstandings/.
207. Scheffer, supra note 206, at 180–82.
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state parties that the ICC be jurisdictionally independent from the UNSC,208
the legality of this position is controversial. Firstly, if, as article 8 bis(2)’s
second paragraph states, an act of aggression shall be determined “in
accordance” with UNGA Resolution 3314 (XXIX), then any such
determination is contingent on UNSC approval.209
The Kampala
Amendment’s Understanding 6 seems to reinforce such an interpretation as
its language mirrors Resolution 3314 article 2 closely.210 Furthermore,
because the U.N. Charter’s language suggests that the Security Council has
authority to determine an act of aggression, many scholars have interpreted
it as the exclusive body with such a right211 Other scholars have rejected
this exclusivity interpretation.212 Even assuming that the Security Council
does not hold this power, however, the amendment seems to indicate that
the Council can unilaterally alter the ICC’s jurisdiction. A strict article 15
bis reading suggests that the prosecutor determines there is a reasonable
basis to proceed with a crime of aggression investigation and notifies the
U.N. Secretary General, who then seeks a Security Council
“determination.”213 What exactly it means to make a “determination” and
how it affects the ICC prosecutor’s investigation and the court’s
proceedings remains ambiguous.214 Whatever the meaning, after the
Security Council has made such a determination, the prosecutor can
proceed with the investigation. 215 Should the Council opt not to make a
determination or somehow be prevented from doing so, the prosecutor must
wait for six months before proceeding with the investigation.216 Outside of
any of this, the Security Council can invoke its article 16 powers to further
delay ICC investigations.217 There exists, however, no specific provision
for what happens when the Security Council makes a negative
determination, which is technically allowed in the amendments.218
Scholars have argued that these different treatments make no sense if
“determination” is used to mean anything other than “a positive
determination.”219 Indeed, if whether the Council makes a positive or
negative finding has no effect on the prosecutor’s investigation, then
208. Trahan, supra note 52, at 61.
209. G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 152; Review Conference, supra note 39, at 18.
210. Compare G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 152 (“[R]equires consideration of all the
circumstances . . . including the gravity of the acts concerned and their consequences, in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.”), with Review Conference, supra note
39, at 18.
211. See infra Part II.B.1.
212. See infra Part II.B.1.
213. Review Conference, supra note 39, at 19; Scheffer, supra note 206, at 180.
214. Scheffer, supra note 206, at 182.
215. Id. at 180.
216. Review Conference, supra note 39, at 19; Scheffer, supra note 206, at 180.
217. Review Conference, supra note 39, at 19; Scheffer, supra note 206, at 180. Drew
Kostic speculates that such a determination could only be made by a formal council
resolution. Drew Kostic, Whose Crime Is It Anyway?: The International Criminal Court and
the Crime of Aggression, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 109, 140 (2012).
218. Review Conference, supra note 39, at 19; see Scheffer, supra note 206, at 182; see
also Kostic, supra note 217, at 139.
219. See, e.g., Scheffer, supra note 206, at 183.
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requiring a six-month waiting period when the Council has remained silent
is redundant.220
2. Use UNGA Resolution 3314 (XXIX)
Another possible standard by which the crime of aggression may be
determined is a strict adherence to Resolution 3314. This approach has the
advantage of emerging out of an international effort and being recognized
as customary international law in whole by numerous legal scholars and in
part by the ICJ.221
However, this resolution also has been severely criticized. Writing at
the time of its passage, Julius Stone noted that it “appears to have codified
into itself (and in some respects extended) all the main ‘juridical loopholes
and pretexts to unleash aggression’ available under preexisting international
law, as modified by the UN Charter.”222 More recently, Gerhard Kemp
called the resolution “not a very successful attempt to define aggression”
from an international criminal law perspective.223 The main concerns
voiced are that the definition lacks clear actus reus (criminal act) and mens
rea (criminal intent) guidance to make it a viable individual criminal
liability.224 Concerning actus reus, articles 1 through 4 define aggression in
terms far too vague to be bases for criminal law.225 The mens rea is
completely absent making the required mental state a mystery and totally
undermining the definition’s usefulness.226 These points are vital to any
code to be used for international criminal liability, since proving these two
elements are a key aspect of domestic laws around the world.227 At both
Nuremberg and Tokyo, the “threat of force” was a central part of the crime
of aggression but does not even appear within this resolution’s text.228
Furthermore, this omission runs contrary to the World War II tribunal
precedents in customary international law since both had these elements of
criminal prosecution.229 Finally, the history of the resolution and its nature
220. Kostic, supra note 217, at 139.
221. See, e.g., Mohammed M. Gomaa, The Definition of the Crime of Aggression and the
ICC Jurisdiction over That Crime, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE CRIME
OF AGGRESSION 55, 74 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2004); Muhammad Aziz Shukri,
Will Aggressors Ever Be Tried Before the ICC?, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
AND THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 33, 35 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2004); Ioana
Gabriela Stancu, Defining the Crime of Aggression or Redefining Aggression?, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 87, 90 (Mauro Politi &
Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2004).
222. Julius Stone, Hopes and Loopholes in the 1974 Definition of Aggression, 71 AM. J.
INT’L L. 224, 224 (1977).
223. KEMP, supra note 11, at 120.
224. Fletcher, supra 142, at 239; KEMP, supra note 11, at 120.
225. G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 152, at 143 (“[T]he use of armed force by a State against
the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.”); KEMP, supra note 11, at
120–21.
226. KEMP, supra note 11, at 120–21.
227. Id. at 120; Fletcher, supra note 142, at 239.
228. Fletcher, supra note 142, at 238.
229. KEMP, supra note 11, at 121–22.
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suggest that states passing it intended for it to be a guide for the Security
Council, not a basis for criminal prosecution.230
B. Procedural Solutions
The legal ambiguity of a crime of aggression, as it relates to humanitarian
intervention, has at three potential procedural solutions: (1) having the
UNSC exclusively determine a crime of aggression, (2) having the UNGA
or the ICJ determine a crime of aggression, and (3) allowing a crime of
aggression exemption where intervention involves regional multilateral
participation.
1. UNSC Approval
One possible solution to the conflict is for the Security Council to
exclusively determine both acts and crimes of aggression. This solution
would be in line with the Council’s existing powers to determine an act of
aggression under U.N. Charter article 39 which, as mentioned below, some
believe grants the Council exclusive power to determine an act of
aggression.231 Others believe that since aggression is so contentious an
issue, it is best left to a political body, like the UNSC, rather than a judicial
one. 232
Other scholars argue that the council does not have exclusive authority to
determine acts or crimes of aggression. 233 They argue that article 39 of the
U.N. Charter maintains that the UNSC authority over acts of aggression is
solely for the purposes of maintaining international peace and security, not
for establishing criminal liability.234 These scholars also point to article
24’s language stating that U.N. members “confer on the Security Council
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security” as implying central, but not exclusive, rights to determine
aggression.235
Among the concerns scholars have voiced against putting this power in
the UNSC’s hands are, firstly, that such a solution leaves a political body to
apply a strictly legal test, no doubt resulting in a myriad of political and fair

230. Fletcher, supra note 142, at 239.
231. Id. at 250.
232. Troy Lavers, [Pre]Determining the Crime of Aggression: Has the Time Come to
Allow the International Court Its Freedom?, 71 ALB. L. REV. 299, 309 (2008).
233. See, e.g., Benjamin B. Ferencz, Enabling the International Criminal Court to Punish
Aggression, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 551, 562 (2007); Lavers, supra note 232, at
303, 309; Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Aggression Under the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, 71 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 497, 511–13 (2002); Mark S. Stein, The
Security Council, the International Criminal Court, and the Crime of Aggression: How
Exclusive Is the Security Council’s Power to Determine Aggression?, 16 IND. INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 1, 13 (2006); Weisbord, supra note 37, at 198.
234. Fletcher, supra note 142, at 250.
235. Id.; see also Giorgio Gaja, The Respective Roles of the ICC and the Security Council
in Determining the Existence of an Aggression, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
AND THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 121, 123 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2004).
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trial issues. 236 Since the five permanent members of the Council each have
veto power over any decision, determining a crime of aggression would
require the agreement of China, France, Russia, the United States, and the
United Kingdom. This would restrict any such determination to essentially
a broad multilateral agreement palatable to the national and political
interests of these five nations.237 The result, some scholars argue, is a
system so incapable of making a determination on aggression that the
Council will often understate the severity of a situation just to gain
consensus.238 Indeed, historically, even in the most serious situations, the
Security Council has shied away from using the term “aggression,” and
instead branded most actions as less severe “[t]hreats to international peace
and security.”239 Furthermore, as mentioned above, where the council has
determined that an act of aggression exists, such decisions have an obvious
political slant.240 Moreover, the Council has even passed resolutions that
are largely inconsistent with international law, undermining any credibility
that they could put political priorities over legal ones.241
Additionally, Carrie McDougall—in her thorough study of what the
UNSC has called aggression—has identified dozens of potential cases that
the Council has ignored while focusing on other, seemingly less severe
ones, where politically unpopular states are the aggressors.242 Furthermore,
she notes that the council has proved itself inconsistent on the severity of
the acts it deems aggression. 243 The term, originally meant to be reserved
for only the most serious breaches of peace, has been used to describe
targeted assassinations to full-scale invasion and everything in between.244
While McDougall partially resolved this inconsistency by pointing out that
the small-scale actions were almost always embedded in larger conflicts,245
this standard of branding is nevertheless too inconsistent for criminal
prosecution.246
A Security Council–exclusive determination of an act or crime of
aggression brings serious concerns over the accused’s ability to obtain a fair
trial.247 For the ICC to guarantee the defendant a fair trial, the prosecution
must prove each element of the offense, including whether the defendant’s

236. See Griffiths, supra note 20, at 309; Stein, supra note 233, at 8 (“The Security
Council is a political body, and it has used the term ‘aggression’ in its resolutions in a
political way.”).
237. See Griffiths, supra note 20, at 309; see also NORMAN BRENTWICH & ANDREW
MARTIN, COMMENTARY ON THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 85 (1951).
238. See Gaja, supra note 235, at 124.
239. See Lavers, supra note 232, at 305–06.
240. See supra Part I.B.1.a.
241. See Lavers, supra note 232, at 306–07.
242. See MCDOUGALL, supra note 99, at 84–85.
243. See id. at 85.
244. See id. at 84–85.
245. See id. at 86.
246. Griffiths, supra note 20, at 309–10.
247. See id. at 310; see also Ntanda Nsereko, supra note 233, at 513.
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actions constitute an act of aggression in the first place.248 The Council,
however, is not a judicial body; its decisions are political, not based on law
and evidence, and thus are certain to fall below the standards of a fair
trial.249
2. UNGA and/or ICJ Determination
Where the Security Council fails to address a prima facie case of
aggression, some have suggested that the General Assembly or the ICJ
could make this determination instead.250 In the General Assembly’s case,
authority for this plan comes from the 1950 Uniting for Peace Resolution,
which allows the UNGA to condemn armed attacks and to authorize the use
of force where the Security Council proves unable to reach a consensus.251
The ICJ’s authority would come from its U.N. Charter article 96 mandate to
advise on “any legal question.”252 Furthermore, as discussed previously
and as commentators have pointed out, both bodies have a history of
determining aggression. 253 The diversity of voices and interests could also
potentially alleviate many of the concerns voiced254 about a straight
Security Council determination.255
Opponents of the General Assembly/ICJ plan argue that the General
Assembly is still a political body and, thus, that many of the most
compelling reasons for avoiding the Security Council would remain
unremedied. 256 Furthermore, this system quickly could break down if the
General Assembly refuses either to rule on an issue or to refer it to the
ICJ.257 Finally, the assembly would suffer from the same lack of legal and
evidentiary standards that would imperil the ability for the accused to obtain
a fair trial.258
3. Regional Multilateralism
Another possible solution is to exempt those who work with regional
groups which carry out intra-regional humanitarian intervention from
prosecution for crimes of aggression. Such a solution has precedent: the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) twice sent
troops into Liberia and Sierra Leone—both ECOWAS member states—to

248. Griffiths, supra note 20, at 310. It is also not clear what the standard of proof would
be.
249. Id.
250. See, e.g., Ferencz, supra note 233, at 562–63.
251. G.A. Res. 337 (V), U.N. Doc. A/RES/377 (Nov. 3, 1951). While an “armed attack”
in and of itself would not be an act of aggression, certainly all acts of aggression would
involve an armed attack in some way.
252. U.N. Charter art. 96.
253. See Fletcher, supra note 142, at 252–53; Weisbord, supra note 37, at 201.
254. Fletcher, supra note 142, at 252 n.206.
255. Id. at 252–53.
256. Id. at 253.
257. Id.
258. Id.

1020

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

intervene in domestic conflicts.259 While these interventions had no legal
basis in the U.N. Charter, they were widely supported by the U.N., the
Security Council, and the international community.260
The Security Council praised ECOWAS in nearly every one of its fifteen
resolutions and nine statements regarding the Liberian Civil War.261 The
council went so far as to specifically exempt ECOWAS forces from
Security Council Resolution 788 weapons importation embargo. 262 It even
formally recognized the ECOWAS forces as part of the peacekeeping effort
in Resolution 866—a move Jeremy Levitt considers a “retroactive de jure
seal on the ECOWAS intervention.”263
Similarly, ECOWAS intervened in Sierra Leone in 1997 after a military
coup ousted the state’s democratically elected President.264 The President
had officially requested an ECOWAS intervention to restore him to power
just before fleeing his country.265 Security Council Resolution 1132
imposed an arms and petroleum embargo against the military junta and
sanctioned ECOWAS as an instrument to enforce the resolution’s terms.266
After ECOWAS forces defeated the rebellion and restored the President to
power, Resolution 1162 commended the organization’s actions.267
Supporters of the regional multilaterism solution argue that regional
organizations are more willing to engage in expensive military actions and
are most likely to have the cultural, lingual, and political knowledge to
know how best to address the inevitable challenges. 268 The multilateral
nature of these organizations “guard[s] against partiality, . . . avoid[s]
escalation of conflicts by inadvertent provocation of important actors,
and . . . invoke[s] the authority of a broad normative community.”269
One particularly illustrative example is NATO, which can claim the
legitimacy of a multinational decision process whose guidelines, joint
treaties, and agreements make it a relatively objective regime.270 As Sean
Murphy argued regarding NATO’s actions in Kosovo, any prosecutor
would surely be “influenced by the fact that this ‘unilateral’ humanitarian
intervention involved sixteen NATO countries—fully democratic and
therefore fully accountable to their people—collectively deciding that the
intervention was justified as a matter of international law and policy.”271

259. See Wedgewood, supra note 177, at 832; see also Jeremy Levitt, Humanitarian
Intervention by Regional Actors in International Conflicts, and the Cases of ECOWAS in
Liberia and Sierra Leone, 12 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 333, 344–45 (1998).
260. Levitt, supra note 259, at 347.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 365.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 366.
267. Id. (citing S.C. Res. 1162, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1162 (Apr. 17, 1998)).
268. Wedgewood, supra note 177, at 832.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 833.
271. Murphy, supra note 170, at 372.
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Furthermore, any conflict severe enough to warrant a humanitarian
intervention is also likely to affect neighboring countries due to the mass
refugee emigration and peripheral violence likely to spill across borders.
This gives regional states very real security concerns to address. Refugees
fleeing the humanitarian emergency in Yugoslavia, for example, burdened
the “delicate political balance in Macedonia” and overwhelmed Albania’s
aid capacity. 272 While neither country was a NATO member at the time,
they both shared (and continue to share) a border with NATO member
Greece. 273 They are also situated in an area where regional instability has
historically had Europe-wide ramifications.
As such, any military
intervention to quell these circumstances and stabilize the country could be
justified under a self-defense rubric allowed by U.N. Charter article 51.274
Opponents of this argument have noted that such intervention still
violates the U.N. Charter.275 Aside from a common reading that military
action is only legal when taken either in self-defense, by invitation, or with
prior Security Council approval, article 53 explicitly allows regional
organizations to intervene militarily only where the Security Council has
approved such action.276 Such critics further point out that, as with the
ECOWAS interventions, the Security Council has often remained silent at
the time of the conflict and retroactively approved the regional
organization’s actions.277 Finally, just because regional states agree on a
decision does not mean that the group is unbiased against the leadership of
a particular country or willing to use force for their own political will under
the guise of humanitarian concerns.278
III. FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE: RESOLVING THE ISSUES
This part proposes an alternative to the current system to better balance
aggression and compassion in international law. It first proposes that the
crime of aggression should be tried exclusively by the ICC. It next urges
that the Security Council should have no power that would dictate which
acts the ICC may investigate as prima facie “acts of aggression” for which
individuals may be criminally liable. Finally, this part advocates for an
affirmative humanitarian intervention defense for crime of aggression
prosecutions to insulate those who use force with compassion against
prosecution.
A. Give the ICC Exclusive Power
The ICC should have exclusive power to prosecute crimes of aggression.
The ICC is one of the few bodies capable of carrying out a fair trial for this
272. Wedgewood, supra note 177, at 832.
273. Member Countries, NATO (Aug. 20, 2013, 9:32 AM), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natolive/topics_52044.htm.
274. U.N. Charter art. 51.
275. See supra note 172.
276. See U.N. Charter art. 53.
277. Wedgewood, supra note 177, at 832.
278. LeClerc-Gagne & Byers, supra note 36, at 386.
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type of crime. 279 It uses judges who make legal rulings and distinctions and
who concern themselves with the rights of the indicted. This makes the
ICC a far better body to carry out a criminal trial and investigation than
many other available options.280 It is also the sole international body that—
despite its flaws—has claimed jurisdiction over the criminal prosecution of
aggression and made an attempt to define the crime and the conditions for
liability.281 Furthermore, a majority of the world’s nations have approved
the ICC’s legitimacy to investigate and prosecute such crimes.282 Though
many major international states still take a strong stand against the body,283
many of these same states are still interested in making the system work as
evidenced by their active participation in the Kampala Amendment
Their objections need not doom the ICC’s future.
conference.284
Furthermore, even in the direst of situations—the ICC indicting a serving
African Head of State—African Union members still chose to remain ICC
parties rather than withdraw their support,285 proving the body’s
international legitimacy and staying power.
B. Remove the Security Council
The Security Council should have no power to deny an aggressive act’s
existence or to block an ICC investigation. First, as the Council itself has
proven in the past, its aggression determinations are too heavily based on
the political will of its five veto-wielding permanent members, and its
determinations are concentrated against particularly convenient state
villains for their involvement in a criminal investigation and prosecution to
be desirable. 286 To give this organization any additional power—let alone
something as crucial as deciding who has committed acts and crimes of
aggression—would undermine the usefulness and legitimacy of this type of
prosecution and the ICC, as the body involved. 287
Second, to deny the Security Council the ability to determine an act of
aggression for criminal liability purposes is in no way a violation of its U.N.
Charter Chapter VII mandate. As noted above, it is widely believed in
customary international law that the Security Council’s power to determine
279. See supra Part I.B.1.b.
280. Compare supra Part II.B.1 (discussing UNSC weaknesses), with supra Part II.A.1.
(discussing ICC strengths).
281. See supra Part I.B.1.b.
282. See supra Part I.B.1.b.
283. See supra Part II.A.1.
284. See, e.g., Kreβ & von Holtzendorff, supra note 55, at 1205 (noting that it was widely
recognized amongst the other delegates that the United States had come to the Kampala
conference with an “open and constructive spirit”); Van Schaak, supra note 44, at 514
(discussing the United States, China, and Russia’s active efforts to place limits on the
Kampala aggression definition).
285. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing African Union objections to the ICC and its recent
withdrawal threats).
286. See supra Parts I.B.2.b, II.B.1 (discussing the UNSC’s aggression determinations).
287. See supra Part I.B.1.b (detailing the Kampala amendment’s procedures); supra Part
II.A.1 (discussing the UNSC’s ambiguous role in aggression determinations as an ICC
weakness).
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acts of aggression was never meant—and still is not meant—to be
exclusive. 288 Regardless, this mandate was certainly never intended to
apply to international criminal prosecutions, but was meant—as the U.N.
Charter plainly states—as a standard by which to “maintain or restore
international peace and security.”289 Because any prosecution for the crime
of aggression comes only after said crime has taken place, determining the
existence of a crime and who has committed it has no direct role in
maintaining or restoring peace and security.
The Security Council’s role in ICC aggression investigation should be
clarified so as to prevent the Council from blocking an investigation. Such
a path was, indeed, the majority will at the Kampala Amendment
discussions, though this issue was largely tabled in the interest of finding a
consensus.290 As mentioned previously, the Rome Statute’s proposed
article 15 bis gives no explicit guidance on what happens when the Security
Council determines that an act the ICC prosecutor wants to investigate is
not aggression.291 Furthermore, giving the Security Council the ability to
interfere with such an investigation indefinitely292 leaves justice
subordinate to political concerns. The Rome Statute should be amended to
exclude this likely possibility.
The political feasibility of this plan is, of course, problematic since it will
deprive some of the world’s most politically, economically, and militarily
powerful countries of control. As the history of the Security Council has
proven, however, there can be no justice or reliable and respected system
for prosecution if a political body can dictate legal decisions.293 That a
single country can block any action only makes a system involving the
UNSC more dubious and incredible. In the interests of justice and deterring
aggression—the point of prosecuting the crime in the first place—the
council should not be involved.
C. Include an Affirmative Defense
In addition to these structural issues, the ICC should reform its crime of
aggression definition. The current definition is too broad, vague, confusing,
and political to allow bona fide humanitarian interventions free from the
specter of criminal liability.294 Because of the resolution’s own deference

288. See supra Part II.B.1 (outlining the arguments against the UNSC aggression
determination being an exclusive power).
289. See U.N. Charter art. 39; see also supra Part II.B.1 (offering arguments against the
Security Council’s determinations being used in a criminal or legal context).
290. Van Schaak, supra note 44, at 515–17.
291. See supra Part II.A.1 for broader discussion on this point.
292. Rome Statute, supra note 33, at art. 16 (“No investigation or prosecution may be
commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security
Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has
requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the
same conditions.”).
293. See supra Part II.B.1.
294. See supra Parts I.B.3.b, II.A.2.
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to the Security Council, the procedure is too intertwined with political
bodies to ensure ICC independence.295
The most effective remedy to this issue would be to provide an
affirmative defense exemption for humanitarian intervention. Such an
exemption would have two evidentiary tiers: a “unilateral intervention” tier
for humanitarian intervention that individual or a small group of states
initiate and a “regional alliance” tier used when regional alliances or small
groups of local nations initiate.
This Note proposes that the “unilateral intervention” tier be crafted along
the same lines as the exemption proposed by Elise Leclerc-Gange and
Michael Byers.296 Under this plan, bona fide humanitarian intervention
would be an affirmative defense in which the accused individuals would be
required to prove all three of the following elements: (1) a humanitarian
principle motivation, (2) prior knowledge of gross human rights violations,
and (3) a well founded belief in the Security Council’s impotence.297
First, the defendant would have the burden of presenting evidence to
show that her principal motivation for using force was “a genuine
humanitarian desire to prevent gross human rights violations” and, finding
such motivation, no individual criminal responsibility would be assigned.298
The accused could prove such intent through evidence such as documents
related to the planning and execution of the military action, diplomatic
communications, and specific orders and illustrated efforts to avoid civilian
casualties. 299 This would allow the ICC to distinguish “bona fide”
interventions from pretextual invasions or occupations. Second, the
accused would need to establish a prior knowledge that gross human rights
violations—those which are “particularly severe”—were occurring in the
target state.300 Third, the accused would have to prove she had a “wellfounded belief” that the Security Council was unable or unwilling to
respond to the crisis for reasons unrelated to the accused’s (or his state’s)
own threats or inaction.301 This would recognize the U.N. Charter’s
preference for Security Council–sanctioned military action.
This Note’s plan differs from the Leclerc-Gange and Byers
recommendations in that it distinguishes interventions by regional alliances
by requiring a more lenient standard of proof (and thus a more easily
proven defense). A defendant could escape liability by proving (1) their
state’s own national security and self-defense were implicated and (2) their
actions were narrowly-tailored to address those concerns.302 The former
could be proven using statistics showing refugee flows, credible reports of
295. See G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 152 (requiring that any prima facie act of aggression
go through the UNSC before being formally defined as such).
296. For full details of their proposed plan, see LeClerc-Gange & Byers, supra note 36, at
386–89.
297. Id. at 387.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 388.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the advantages of regional multilateralism).
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border incursions, harm to noncombatants in bordering states, or intragovernmental documents showing intention. The court itself could judge
the latter using established precedent, reports from local defense
departments and international organizations about their actions and goals,
and the results of what actually took place. This distinction for regional
interventions recognizes (1) the subjective nature of proving a humanitarian
intervention was bona fide, (2) the legitimate security concerns that states
face, and (3) the legitimacy a regional organization gives.
The benefits of a two-tier system are extensive. First, the affirmative
defense incentivizes states which would act alone or with scarce support to
be extremely careful in how they conduct humanitarian interventions since
their rationale will have to withstand strict legal scrutiny. One could
imagine the governments and defense departments of particularly active
states setting up protocols by which information on their justification and
actions is well recorded and collected. Second, those states will have
incentive to work through regional organizations near the troubled target
state because of the relaxed legal standard. Third, it would legitimize these
types of interventions since regional groups will ostensibly be acting
primarily to address their own security and self-defense concerns. They
could thus more credibly invoke the U.N. Charter’s self-defense exception
to the otherwise legally troublesome use of force.303 Additionally, since
U.N. involvement—through peacekeeping, development, and aid—almost
inevitably follows any bona fide humanitarian intervention, and that
involvement is usually heavily reliant on the cooperation of regional
groups, a retroactive endorsement of the humanitarian intervention is far
more likely. 304 Fourth, the regional organizations need local knowledge
and expertise and would mitigate the logistical challenges and costs
inherent to any humanitarian intervention.305 Fifth, working in cooperation
with regional groups would increase the popularity of such intervention in
distant, powerful states through lessened risks for their personnel and a
more limited financial involvement. This, in turn, will make humanitarian
interventions more frequent and, most importantly, save civilian lives.
Finally, the two-tier system gives regional organizations an incentive to
deal with potential humanitarian situations early enough to prevent more
horrific and extensive atrocities because they will not be hindered by
unclear or high evidentiary barriers.
Finally, the two-tier solution is both realistic and practical since slightly
modifying the ICC’s definition and relation to the Security Council does not
require a huge rebalancing and reorganization of the U.N. Charter–
mandated prerogatives or require the enactment of a completely new legal
organization.
Applying this test to the above hypothetical and real life events may
prove useful. Indicted government and military officials from the coalition
303. U.N. Charter art. 51.
304. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the U.N. retroactive endorsement of ECOWAS
activity and incorporation of their own activities with ECOWAS forces).
305. See supra Part II.B.3.
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that invaded Bellicosia would use the “unilateral intervention” tier, since no
regional organizations were utilized. They would thus have to submit
evidence proving the Bellicosian government’s atrocities, their own
government’s concern with them, and the threatened Security Council veto
of the Bellicosian ally prevented the authorization of force through any of
the international channels. Leaders of a “lone wolf” regional state who
invaded one of its neighbors—say, Vladimir Putin in Russia’s recent
invasion of Ukraine—would be under the same tier and would have to
prove that (1) evidence of the Ukrainian government’s atrocities against its
own people, (2) the Russian invasion was due to these concerns, and
(3) Russia was blocked in the Security Council from being able to get their
military action authorized. Such a defense would likely fail. Even if
Russia, or a country in a similar future situation, were to use a regional
alliance which they effectively control to break into the lower tier—a
situation the court would likely see through anyway—it likely would still
fail since the defendant would have to prove both there was an actual threat
to the national security of his or her country and that the invasion was
narrowly tailored to address this problems. An annexation or permanent
occupation simply would not meet the guidelines.
CONCLUSION
The easiest solution, of course, would be to abandon international
criminal liability for the crime of aggression completely. Indeed, doing so
would avoid many of the inevitable political and legal battles to come.
Though perhaps overly idealistic, individual liability for the crime of
aggression is a piece of customary international law worth preserving and
advancing. It may be hard to imagine that such a system would work
flawlessly in today’s world, but a system to legally punish planners and
executors of wars of aggression is certainly a part of the world in which we
wish we lived.
Such a system, however, is doomed at the start if it is not crafted to the
highest legal standards. This is only possible if the system removes
political bodies completely. Furthermore, its legal standards must be clear
enough to allow and incentivize humanitarian intervention in the horrible
yet inevitable cases of necessity. The two-tier formula outlined above
would fulfill all of these needs.
Perhaps, in our increasingly globalized world, where sovereignty—and
thus aggression—increasingly has no meaning, we must deal with the
realities of our current paradigm. There will long be a need both to bring
the world’s aggressors to justice and for powerful nations to use force to
defend the world’s humanity. If international law is to fulfill the goals that
the post-World War II world had envisioned for it, a robust and
unambiguous system to prosecute aggression while allowing the best uses
of force is vital.
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Appendix 1.
List of Officials Indicted on Aggression Charges
at World War II Tribunals.

Name

Tribunal

Result

Major Positions During the War

BORMANN

Nuremberg

Guilty
(Other
grounds)

Reichsleiter; Chief of Staff, Office of
Führer’s Deputy; Head, Party Chancellery

DONITZ

Nuremberg

Guilty

Head of State; Commander-in-Chief,
German Navy

FRANK

Nuremberg

Guilty
(Other
grounds)

Reichsleiter; President, Academy of
German Law

FRICK

Nuremberg

Guilty

Minister of the Interior; Reich Protector of
Bohemia and Moravia

FRITZSCHE

Nuremberg

Not Guilty

Director, Wireless News Service
Ministry; Head of Radio Propaganda
Ministry

FUNK

Nuremberg

Guilty

Minister of Economics; President of
Reichsbank; Member, Central Planning
Board

GORING

Nuremberg

Guilty

Commander-in-Chief, German Air Force;
Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan

HESS

Nuremberg

Guilty

Member, Secret Cabinet Council;
Member, Council for the Defense of the
Reich

JODL

Nuremberg

Guilty

Chief, National Defense Section; Chief,
Operations Staff

KALTENBRUNNER

Nuremberg

Guilty
(Other
grounds)

Head, German Secret Police; Head, Reich
Security Office

KEITEL

Nuremberg

Guilty

Chief, High Command of the Armed
Forces

RAEDER

Nuremberg

Guilty

Admiral
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Name

Tribunal

Major Positions During the War

ROSENBERG

Nuremberg

Guilty

Head, Nazi Ideological & Educational
Research; Minister, E. Occupied
Territories

SAUCKEL

Nuremberg

Guilty
(Other
grounds)

High Officer, German Secret Police;
Member, Reichstag

SCHACHT

Nuremberg

Not Guilty

President of the Reichsbank; Minister
without Portfolio

SEYSS-INQUART

Nuremberg

Guilty

Austrian Minister of Security and Interior

SPEER

Nuremberg

Guilty
(Other
grounds)

Minister for Armaments and Munitions;
Member, Central Planning Board

STREICHER

Nuremberg

Guilty
(Other
grounds)

Member, Reichstag; Editor, Anti-Semitic
Weekly Newspaper

von NEURATH

Nuremberg

Guilty

Minister of Foreign Affairs; President,
Secret Cabinet Council

von PAPEN

Nuremberg

Not Guilty

Ambassador to Turkey

von RIBBENTROP

Nuremberg

Guilty

Minister of Foreign Affairs

von SCHIRACH

Nuremberg

Guilty
(Other
grounds)

Leader, Youth in the German Reich;
Governor & Defense Commissioner of
Vienna

ARAKI

Tokyo

Guilty

General; Minister of Education; Minister
of War

DOHIHARA

Tokyo

Guilty

General; Minister of Education; Minister
of War

HASHIMOTO

Tokyo

Guilty

Army Officer
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Major Positions During the War

HATA

Tokyo

Guilty

Commander, China Army; Inspector
General of Military Education; Minister of
War

HIRANUMA

Tokyo

Guilty

Home Minister; Minister without
Portfolio; President, Privy Council; Prime
Minister

HIROTA

Tokyo

Guilty

Foreign Minister; Prime Minister

HOSHINO

Tokyo

Guilty

Chief Secretary of the Cabinet; Minister
w/o Portfolio; President, Planning Board

ITAGAKI

Tokyo

Guilty

Chief of Staff of the China Army,
Commander of the S.E. Asia Army;
Minister of War

KAYA

Tokyo

Guilty

Finance Minister

KIDO

Tokyo

Guilty

Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal; Minister of
Education

KIMURA

Tokyo

Guilty

Commander, Burma Army; Chief of Staff,
Kwangtun Army; Vice War Minister

KOISO

Tokyo

Guilty

Chief of Staff, Kwangtun Army; Governor
of Korea; Prime Minister

MATSUI

Tokyo

Guilty
(Other
grounds)

Commander, Shanghai Expeditionary
Force

MINAMI

Tokyo

Guilty

Commander, Kwantung Army; Governor
of Korea

MUTO

Tokyo

Guilty

Chief, Military Affairs Bureau; Chief of
Staff, Philippines Army

OKA

Tokyo

Guilty

Chief, Naval Affairs Bureau at the Naval
Ministry

OSHIMA

Tokyo

Guilty

Military Attache, Berlin Embassy;
Ambassador to Germany
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SATO

Tokyo

Guilty

Chief, Military Affairs Bureau

SHIGEMITSU

Tokyo

Guilty

Foreign Minister

SHIMADA

Tokyo

Guilty

Naval Minister

SHIRATORI

Tokyo

Guilty

Advisor to Foreign Office; Ambassador to
Italy

SUZUKI

Tokyo

Guilty

Minister w/o Profile

TOGO

Tokyo

Guilty

Foreign Minister

TOJO

Tokyo

Guilty

Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army; Prime
Minister; Minister of War; Vice Minister
of War

UMEZU

Tokyo

Guilty

Commander, Kwantung Army;
Commander, Northern China Army; Vice
Minister of War

